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A PROGRAM FOR PROSPERITY

New Republic



"The Infernal Kingdom"

French Morocco—A Colony Where One of the World's Richest Rulers Governs by Terror.

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T. R. B.

★

Washington Wire

The continuing McCarthy story has its discouraging side. But the important thing is that McCarthy is diminished. Of that there is no longer doubt. The public begins to understand him and the Senate is sick of him.

The quintessential McCarthy appeared the night the Senate tried to duck the issue by voting 75 to 12, for the six-man inquiry. McCarthy knew he was dealing with timid men and made little effort to hide it. Every familiar mannerism was underlined but the basic bully inside him was most conspicuous. McCarthy was saying, "I don't want your love, I want your fear." He seemed determined that if there were one man left in the chamber whom he had not insulted he would correct the omission then and there.

He defied Senate practices. He cited critics by name and demanded their pledges that they would submit to subpoena if called upon. He did not yield an inch. It was an extraordinary —a brilliant performance; no one could doubt his talents—genius, perhaps, is the better word. Though he was the accused he half-succeeded in putting his adversaries on the defensive. Without rebuke he violated every Senate canon, using direct names, making personal insults (calling Fulbright, "Halfbright"); declaring that his accusers "will either indict themselves for perjury, or will prove what consummate liars they are."

Then Joe stalked out Napoleonically. He didn't wish to hear the cool reply of a man not afraid of him. Fulbright (D, Ark.) observed, as much in wonder as in loathing, "Imagine the effrontery of this fellow!" He added, "He has the most extraordinary talent for disruption and causing confusion in any orderly process that I have ever seen."

McCarthy humiliated the timid body, but the Senate is getting sick of it. The New committee may dodge the issue but the mere fact of its creation is a sign of changed times; it carries no comfort for the hydrophobic fringe of followers bitten by McCarthyism. Flanders (R, Vt.) has pushed the Senate leaders far beyond the point that cynical observers could have thought likely.

We probably shouldn't expect consistency in politics. Still:

> Our children deserve a little better of us than to keep hanging bigger and bigger debts about their necks that they have to meet before they get square with the world or the future. —Dwight Eisenhower, Providence, R. I., Oct. 20, 1952
>
> Treasury Secretary Humphrey Asks $10 Billion Debt Limit Rise; Gets $5 Billion—Headline, Aug. 5, 1954

This column favors raising the national debt limit, just as the Administration advocates. True, Ike made the voters believe—if he did not say so directly—that as President he would promptly balance the budget and cut the debt, just as the farmers believed that he had pledged himself to supporting 100 percent parity and the Tennessee Valley believed he was going to expand TVA. But it can be argued that Ike didn't know what he was talking about at that period. The important thing now is that the debt ceiling is dangerously low and that rigid restrictions hamper the Treasury in dangerous times. Imposing a debt ceiling at all is a childish proceeding: if Congress wanted to economize it could do so by cutting its own appropriations. Chief effect of the ceiling right now is to make the Treasury engage in trick bookkeeping and curtail valuable enterprises.

For example, under the Atomic Energy bill, the Administration would farm out the construction of a $100 million TVA steam generating plant to a private utility because that way it would not be included in the precious national "debt," although as a sound, self-liquidating federal project it would be cheaper to do it that way in the long run than to hand it over to a private monopoly. The procedure fits into Administration prejudices but it is also urged by bookkeeping figures.

It never seems possible to separate rational economics from political balderdash. Democrats naturally now are going to get all the political advantage they can in emphasizing that Ike hasn't balanced the budget, and is raising the debt limit. Personally we don't think Ike should try to balance the budget right now, with four or five million unemployed. Ike is paying the penalty, of course, of his campaign pledges. Democrats have no monopoly of playing politics with economics. Republicans keep charging that whereas Ike's deficit is only $3 billion, Truman "forecast" a $9.9 billion deficit for the same period. What they neglect to say is that Truman in his final budget sent to a Republican Congress specifically stated that he was basing his estimates on tax laws as they were then written, including the forthcoming expiration of the Excess Profits Tax, and that he would recommend higher taxes to offset these expenditures and reduce this deficit. Ike himself extended EPT six months. Truman's position was that the nation needed full military protection against Russia and could afford the taxes to pay for it. Truman was more conservative on defense protection than Ike; he was unwilling to take the "calculated risk" Ike has taken. To be precise about it, $3.8 billions of Ike's budget savings in the past 12 months came from cuts in Truman's proposed defense budget. Is this wise? You can't tell whether you have saved money on fire insurance till you have a fire.

Notes: Abraham Chasanow, Navy civilian employee accused as a security risk, has now gone one full year without pay and, without final determination; that's why even innocent men quit government service in the most cases the minute they are accused—who wants to lose a year's wage and pay legal costs to be vindicated? . . . Interior Secretary McKay endorses recommendations of a survey team looking to turning federal mine safety regulations back to states in spite of dreadful accident records; another New Deal reform that has to be fought for all over again.

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Noteworthy This Week

BEHIND THE HEADLINES

McCarthy—Has the Senate Had Enough?

THE HEARST newspaper organization tries to be helpful to Joseph McCarthy. It was Hearst columnist George Sokolsky who first brought Roy Cohn and the Senator together. Now we learn that the letter attacking General George Marshall, written by Roosevelt's former Secretary of War Harry Woodring (which McCarthy quoted in his own defense during the Senate censure debate) was given to McCarthy by Robert M. Harriss of New York. The press described Harriss as a "cotton broker" —which he was until last December. It was not generally reported that Harriss is also general treasurer of the Hearst Corporation. But whatever lifelines his friends throw McCarthy, they may not be able to save him.

The six-man committee selected by the Senate to consider disciplinary action against McCarthy is made up uniformly of conservatives whom McCarthy cannot easily attack. They come from the South and the West where his followers are few. The Senior Republican, Arthur Watkins of Utah, alone is regarded as friendly toward McCarthy. Frank Carlson of Kansas is an Administration supporter who will go as far as the President wishes. Francis Case is an independent, forthright and unpredictable man.

On the Democratic side Edwin Johnson of Colorado is much the strongest member. In turn the most influential man in forming public opinion in Colorado and one who will probably support Johnson in his campaign for Governor this fall is Palmer Hoyt, publisher of *The Denver Post,* who has been sharply critical of McCarthy.

John Stennis of Mississippi and Sam Ervin of North Carolina, the two remaining Democrats, are both former judges. They are not strong Senators but they are well liked. And like most Southerners up from impoverished country, they feel deeply the honor of belonging to the Senate, and the necessity of protecting the Senate against dishonorable men.

The six men are charged with preparing a prompt report. In this, the Senate has placed the Committee that presided over the Army-McCarthy hearings in a quandary. The unhappy Karl Mundt is still hopefully grappling with a 900-page "Condensation" of the hearings made by Ray Jenkins. All Mundt has been able to suggest is that he will "condense" it further.

The new Committee can hardly report before some comment by the previous Committee created to investigate McCarthy is released. It seems probable that the Watkins Committee will hold hearings, but make no finding until after the November elections. The Senate will recess in August, and then return in the late autumn to take action upon the new report.

The first task of the Committee is to sift the hard indictments from the general criticisms in the charges it must consider. The 36 charges submitted by Senator Flanders include many acts of a boorish man which still do not constitute grounds for punishment by the Senate. In contrast the acceptance of $10,000 from the Lustron Corporation, the release of the secret FBI "letter" and the financial manipulations of McCarthy, are acts more reprehensible than the decision of Senator Bingham to permit a lobbyist to attend a closed hearing for which the Senator was censured in 1929.

It seems plain that McCarthy's Senate seat may turn on his performance before the Watkins Committee. He cannot attack the integrity of the Committee as he did in the Army hearings. He will instead attempt to center his fire on the weakest charges, such as the charge that he persecuted Annie Lee Moss. If he seems chastened and co-operative, he may escape. But his action in the Senate debate suggests that he is incapable of restraint for long. His threats of libel suits, his bullying of the Senators, his reference to Senator Fulbright as "Half-bright—in itself additional evidence of "conduct unbecoming a Senator"—all suggest that McCarthy may act true to form when he becomes the hunted once more. In that event, or so conservative Senators maintain, the Watkins Committee will not be kicked around as Karl Mundt let himself be kicked around. Obstructionism by McCarthy will lead to a critical report, and a report strongly critical is followed logically by expulsion.

Foreign Economic Aid

EXCEPT for the last formalities, Congress has wrapped up the foreign aid bill—the eighth such annual installment since the Greek-Turkish program was started in 1947. The total authorization of $3,054 million is $1,500 million less than last year and less than half as much as the peak year of 1951.

The emphasis is heavily military and heavily on the Far East. Aid for Europe, which accounted for 89 per cent of the program in 1951, is down to 26 percent this year.

As a matter of fact, Congress approved the economic and Point Four program with surprisingly little opposition. It even increased Point Four by $5 million above the Administration's request. The cuts in economic development funds were relatively slight. The economic development program for India is the biggest and by far the most important of this type of assistance.

The battle which was won in the authorization bill, however, is in grave danger of being lost in John Taber's House Appropriations Committee. The reductions in appropriations, which this committee made and which the House approved, are not so drastic overall as on relatively small but extremely im-

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portant individual items. The House totally eliminated, for example, an $18 million item for our contribution to the United Nations technical assistance program. If this is not restored, it will mean the Russians will be free to take over what is left of one of the most hopeful and popular UN activities.

Atomic Compromise

The House and Senate conferees seem to have worked out most of the major points at issue in the Atomic Energy Bill. Short of a new fight by the Senators on the patent or power provisions, the Bill may soon be law.

The purpose of the Bill is to open the atomic energy industry to private enterprise. Already the industry apart from all major government-built plants, has a turnover of $450 million a year. This production, in mining, in the processing of radioactive isotopes for industrial and medical purposes, and in the construction of instruments, is wholly unaffected by the Bill. Nor will the Bill put atomic power in every home tomorrow as too many of its ardent advocates have so blithely promised. The situation is best expressed by one financier in the industry: "There was a wall that stood against development five or 10 years ahead of where we are now. The Bill demolishes the wall. The result may be to encourage forward-looking investors. But to everyone outside the industry the next five years will seem very much the same."

Tennessee: End of the Road for Pat Sutton

TENNESSEE has not tolerated an isolationist in office in a generation. When Senator Shields exhibited isolationist tendencies three decades ago, he was promptly removed from office. "Me Too" Tom Stewart met the same fate in 1948. Tennessee's firm commitment to internationalism was reaffirmed last week when the state sent Estes Kefauver back to the Senate by an overwhelming majority.

It appears that the general election will be nothing more than a formality. Ray Jenkins, the Knoxville attorney who achieved temporary prominence in the recent McCarthy hearings, has announced that in spite of his nomination in the Republican primary he was not and will not be a candidate.

The plan to liquidate Kefauver was patterned after the efforts that overthrew Tydings in Maryland, Graham in North Carolina, and Pepper in Florida. Professionals who had helped in those races were retained to stage-manage Dem. Rep. Pat Sutton's campaign. By the middle of July it was picking up speed. Happy Dixiecrats climbed aboard the Sutton helicopter. Three of the state's eight major newspapers enlisted in Sutton's behalf, a fourth announced its neutrality. Sutton tapped abundant financial sources from without and within the state, compared with a trickle of funds into Sen. Kefauver's headquarters.

Then almost abruptly Sutton's campaign floundered, his audiences dwindled to almost nothing, he found it difficult and at times impossible to find speakers to introduce him. So complete was the collapse that he carried only four of the state's ninety-five counties—his home county and Fayette, Crockett, and Haywood, the three West Tennessee counties where the South's Dixiecrat movement originated in 1947—and lost by more than 200,000 votes. Boss Ed Crump refused to bless Sutton. The Negro vote in the state was 70 to one for Kefauver, the labor vote almost as high, and the farm vote almost three to one.

Sutton was not a heavyweight, but he was a much more promising prospect than the men who beat Tydings and Graham. His excellent voice, handsome face, and maudlin demogoguery took with voters already softened by the Bible-belt demagoguery of Tennessee's Governor Clement. The political climate began to change, however, as evidence of Sutton's affiliations with Texas oil and underworld interests began to be known. He hastened his own undoing by the increasing recklessness of his charges. But his major blunder was to shift the campaign emphasis in the last four weeks to isolationism versus internationalism.

For Kefauver the resounding vote of confidence is a matter of first importance. The 1952 charge that he "sold out the South" at the Democratic convention is silenced. As the Southerner who has made the most powerful bid for the Presidential nomination since the Civil War, he is once more very much in the national picture.

Nudge for November

DEMOCRATIC strategists in Washington are warning Congressional candidates against staking too much on the issue of "the Republican recession." By November unemployment may not be the problem it is now in much of the country. The Administration intends to attack along two fronts beginning in early September. The economy is to be given "a nudge," according to Commerce Secretary Sinclair Weeks (who has been the leader of the Cabinet

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group in denying that the economy is in any trouble)—"a relatively substantial one." "Depressed areas," which were promised federal help months ago, are finally to get it—ship-building and textile communities are first on the list. Political pressures will increase the demand for "aid to depressed areas" as November approaches.

But it is now admitted in government circles that this kind of spot treatment will not be enough. "It probably will take a substantial acceleration in government spending to make sure of the desired result," the *Journal of Commerce* warned its readers last week.

Mr. Weeks' Commerce Department will help strengthen construction activity by making allocations to the states for new highways six months earlier than usual this year—in the Fall instead of next Spring. But the force of the upswing will come largely from the letting of new military orders next month. New York investment bankers are acting on the information that $3-$5 billion worth of new contracts will be signed soon—the greatest portion for aircraft and guided missiles.

The Strange Alliance

IN the 1954 Maine Republican primaries, Senator Margaret Chase Smith said she wanted to win "for true and loyal Maine people who have refused to sell their votes for oil money." She was referring to her support of the amendment to the Tidelands oil bill which would have permitted government revenues to be used to aid education.

Now, the curious announcement has been made in Oregon that Senator Smith is to stump that state for Senator Guy Cordon, who led the fight in the Senate to defeat the oil-for-education proposal which Mrs. Smith favored, and who recently declared that the American people were being "over-educated."

Party loyalty notwithstanding, this is a strange role, indeed, for the liberal lady from Maine, since Cordon has had a voting record even more anti-liberal than that of Mrs. Smith's old enemy, Joe McCarthy. The Oregon Republican cast one of the 13 votes against ratifying the North Atlantic Treaty; he even opposed a Federal aid-to-education bill which had the approval of Robert A. Taft and Arthur Vandenberg.

London Dispatch TORY REVOLT

Parliament has just risen for nearly three months holiday after the most exciting week of the session. During this week the House of Commons witnessed its first full-scale public rebellion against the Conservative leadership, over the agreement with Egypt under which all British troops will be withdrawn from the Suez Canal within 20 months. Twenty-six Tories voted against the government but since the Labour Party abstained, this was a harmless demonstration.

Much more important was the mood of the Conservative Party as evinced in the debate itself. To disarm criticism, the government put up the War Minister, Anthony Head, as its first speaker. Head is a Regular Army Brigadier General of great charm; speaking wholly without notes, he spent 20 minutes putting the strategic case against maintaining the base in Suez. Attlee followed with one of the most effective speeches of his life, in which he flayed Churchill for two years' delay in accepting the policy which the Labour government had initiated against furious Tory protests. When he sat down almost the whole of the Conservative benches rose as one man to intervene. The Speaker called on Captain Charles Waterhouse, leader of the Tory rebels, and until this month Chairman of the Conservative Defense Committee. Waterhouse was deadly, and quite unsparing in his attack. "This is not a sell-out," he said, "it is a give-away. If the electors of this country had foreseen this agreement in 1951, we would not be sitting on this side of the House."

Though several Labour back-benchers spoke, Eden's summing-up was directed wholly to his own party—and was effective enough to detach some 15 of the rebels from the Waterhouse group. But the Conservatives have by no means heard the last of the Suez issue—it is bound to take the first place at their annual conference in October.

Churchill himself made no speech in the debate, sitting glum and stony-faced under criticism which was directed primarily at him as a traitor to Tory imperialism. But he was stung by one Labour speaker into a remarkable interjection. Moved almost to tears, he rose to say that the hydrogen bomb had made strategic conceptions which were well founded a year ago utterly obsolete today. "If I were to portray to the House," he stammered, choking with emotion, "the first few weeks of a war as it would be under present conditions, I would convince members of the obsolescence of the base."

In using the hydrogen bomb to justify its *volte-face*, the government makes nonsense of its determination to return to Suez in case of war. So the argument is not taken too seriously. But this intervention of Churchill's together with his references to the hydrogen bomb in his report on the Washington Conference, have made many people wonder if he is not personally so unbalanced on this subject as to constitute a serious danger to British foreign policy. Indeed, one paradoxical result of the Suez debate has been to increase Eden's stature in the Conservative Party, while reducing Churchill's.

The "Churchill must go" movement has grown still more vocal through Churchill's latest Cabinet reshuffle. The resignation of the Minister of Agriculture created a good chance for a major change. When Churchill seemed to be hesitating over this, Oliver Lyttleton, the Colonial Secretary, tried to force his hand by offering his resignation too—in any case he had long wanted to return to business life. The Attorney General also stated publicly that he wants to resign as soon as possible, and rumor agrees that Lord Alexander, Lord Woolton, and Sir Walter Monckton are impatient to withdraw from politics. However, Churchill accepted only Lyttleton's resignation, and made the minimum adjustments required to fill the two vacant posts. As the *Economist* said, "To a government needing a blood tranfusion, Sir Winston Churchill has given a liver pill."

It now seems unlikely that there will be a really major government reconstruction so long as Churchill is Prime Minister.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

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Paris Dispatch THE CAPACITY TO CHOOSE

The Brussels conference promises to be as important in the evolution of a New Europe as the Geneva conference was in relation to Asia. In any event the meeting of the foreign ministers of the six nations of Little Europe will almost certainly decide the future part of France in the European pattern. And what comes out of the Brussels conference will be settled largely by the face-to-face meetings of Konrad Adenauer, West Germany's grand old man, and Pierre Mendès-France, the dynamic young thinker and doer of a new France in process of becoming.

Adenauer has for a long time been talking toughly about what France should or must do, and also setting time limits. His voice and words have recently been made harsh by overtones of the old Diktat. But all this has suddenly become out of date. For the fact is that Western Europe is now functioning politically on Mendès-France time.

Mendès-France is not relying on his charm in dealing with Adenauer, nor for that matter on any of the strong elements in his personal arsenal. The subject of their discussions will moreover be far broader than French ratification of EDC; it will be the whole European situation and the roles of France and Germany in its future evolution.

It is obvious of course that the result of the Brussels meeting, especially of the personal confrontation of the German Chancellor and the French Premier, will be the preface—for better or worse—of what the French National Assembly is to do about EDC. But a preface to Brussels has already been written. Mendès-France goes to the meeting with a blank check signed by the Assembly, with greater economic power in a broader political and psychological frame of reference than the politicians in the Palais Bourbon have given any other statesman since the Liberation.

The goal of these powers, of the economic and social New Deal as defined by Mendès-France himself, is the reconquest of national economic independence. This means that France must go through a hard process of reconstruction, so that she may be strong enough to face and meet emergent German strength.

Adenauer's statements about France and EDC, at times preceding similar statements from Washington, at other times echoing them, have emphasized that Paris was out of step with the capitals of the other free nations of the West.

M. Mendès-France, never one of those Frenchmen who lives in dread of the goose step, argued all along that unison on the march depended on ending the war in Indo-China and then starting domestic reforms. He has kept his word and his time table.

After Indo-China, what concerned him most was that France was out of step economically. French internal prices are on the average 15 percent higher than world prices. The country and its people have been living in false security, created by dollars furnished by Washington for continuation of the war in Asia. The flow of dollars is stopping. And the Premier has achieved the enormous feat of getting the Assembly to let him use executive decrees for a period of months in order to rebuild the economic structure.

Thus far he has been successful in using psychological shock treatment. Tunisia showed that he was a man of action as well as of thought; that he could be severe to the point of ruthlessness as well as bold and daring. His political timing, packaging and presentation have been superb. But he will need all the talents he can muster to put the economic reforms into effect.

It can be predicted that in his private meetings with Adenauer, the French Premier will be at least as tough as he must be toward his own countrymen. On the Saar, on other European issues and on Franco-German relations as well as on the issue of EDC, Mendès-France will follow his favorite formula: governing means the ability to make choices between alternatives, and also the power to make one's opponent choose between alternatives.

Adenauer's personal position in his own country is weakening. That of Mendès-France is growing stronger. With the blank check on the New Deal in his pocket, he will negotiate from strength. Above all, he will reject Adenauer's insistence that there is and can be no alternative of any kind to EDC. Without the possibility of changes, negotiation is impossible; and Mendès-France goes to Brussels to negotiate.

When the French Premier met Secretary Dulles in Paris during the final phase of the Geneva conference, he showed what he meant by the doctrine that choosing is the essence of negotiation as well as of governing. In a room at the Quai d'Orsay, alone with the Secretary, he spread a map of Indo-China on the floor, anchoring its four corners with bottles of cognac. He invited Dulles to get down, with him, on hands and knees; and to follow a full and clear exposition.

Here, he said, pointing to the thirteenth parallel of latitude, is where Georges Bidault was prepared to make the demarcation line. For even before Dien Bien Phu, the military men knew the war couldn't be won, or even long continued. Here, he went, at the end, pointing to the seventeenth parallel, is where the line could be drawn if the US sent a top man—either Dulles or Smith—back to Geneva. Make your choice, he concluded simply. Or give us any other alternative. Whatever it is, if you back it up as it needs to be backed up (that is, with US military strength), we will go along. Dulles made his choice.

The choice given Molotov was very different. Either, said Mendès-France, you get Red China and the Viet-Minh to go through with the settlement. Or you will soon have in France, to deal with on the European situation and on Germany, not me, but an authoritarian, if not a totalitarian military government. Such an alternative was possible, of course. Mendès-France said that as a matter of fact he had prepared for it by naming the Gaullist, General Koenig, as a member of his government. Molotov also made his choice.

Paris FRANK GORRELL

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Marrakech, Morocco, is not only where Sir Winston Churchill escapes from English winters and paints. It is the headquarters of one of the world's richest and most ruthless despots—El Glaoui. Since French Premier Mendes-France's negotiations for partial independence for Tunisia, violent agitation for national autonomy has increased in Morocco. It threatens the French and their feudal overlord in Marrakech whose formula for suppressing nationalists has been "Hang 10 and buy 50."

"The Infernal Kingdom"

by Joachim Joesten

Marrakech

"He is all but intangible—a law unto himself. He will defy even the Resident-General, if the latter does not conform to his wishes. There is absolutely no limit to his insolence and audacity. He is free to commit any crime of his choosing, from theft and forgery to arbitrary seizure and murder. Southern Morocco is ruled by terror and abject fear. It is an infernal kingdom, where violence, fraud, iniquity and knavery reign unchecked. . . ."

THIS terrible indictment of His Excellency, Hadj Thami el Glaoui, the Pasha of Marrakech, was written more than *twenty years ago* by a French author, Gustave Babin, who had lived in Morocco for many years and had several books about that country and its people to his credit.

Few Frenchmen, even in official positions, and hardly any native Moroccans would even bother to dispute the basic facts about the Glaoui's personality and career: that he is a despot and a killer; that he draws a large portion of his huge income from organized prostitution; and that his rule is personal and predatory. The Pasha's staunchest supporters and intimate friends rarely question the truth of these charges. Their defense, usually, consists of a cynical shrug. "Morocco," they explain, "is still a medieval country, with medieval customs. We can't do anything about it. We don't want to interfere with local customs and traditions. As long as he doesn't interfere with *our* rights and privileges, we can't tell the Glaoui how to behave. And, after all, don't forget he's quite a character. What a strong, colorful personality. . . ."

For more than 40 years now, the Glaoui has been an immovable fixture in Moroccan politics. This is not to say that he could not be legally removed. A pasha, in Morocco, does not rule in his own right and his office is not hereditary. The pashas are governors of big cities, appointed and removed by the Sultan (or so the legal fiction goes; in practice, appointments and removals are made by the French Resident-General).

In almost every other city of Morocco, the turnover in pashas has been regular and heavy. But not in Marrakech. There in spite of a record that cries out for dismissal and punishment, the Glaoui has ruled, and continues to rule as though he were the absolute monarch of an independent nation. He has seen half a dozen Sultans come and go, and scores of Resident-Generals.

The secret of the Glaoui's immunity and immutability lies in the machiavellism of French colonial policies. Ever since France gained control of Morocco by the Treaty of Fez (March 30, 1912) it has been her established policy to play the South against the North, the Berbers against the Arabs, the peasant against the townsman. By building up the Glaoui as a "Sultan of the South," the French secured a potent counterweight against the real Sultan in Rabat, the nominal ruler of all three parts of divided Morocco. Whenever the Sultan pressed for greater power, the French brought the Pasha of Marrakech into play. Whenever the Istiqlal nationalists demonstrated for independence (as they are doing today) the Glaoui's Berber cavalry rode down into the northern plains threatening to sack the rebellious cities and massacre their predominantly Arab inhabitants.

Beyond his leverage with the French however, the Glaoui's power is locally based. For he is not only Pasha of Marrakech, but also "caid" (chieftain) of the Glaouas, the most numerous and powerful of the Berber tribes of the High Atlas.

SINCE the turn of the century, the Glaoui's family has held undisputed sway over a vast territory on either side of the Atlas Mountains. While the Pasha's claim to be the descendant of an old aristocratic clan, dating its origins back to Haroun el Rashid, is built on myth, the family was established among the lords of Southern Morocco long before the French

Joachim Joesten is the author of four books on international events and has contributed to Foreign Affairs, Barron's *and the* Antioch Review.

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Republic established her protectorate over Morocco.

In those days, while the great powers of Europe were scrambling for footholds in the nominally still independent, but enfeebled Sherifian Empire, it was said of the four Glaoua brothers that they had agreed to prepare for all possible contingencies: one took the side of the French, another moved toward the Spanish, the third sought British support and the fourth looked to the Germans.

Thami el Glaoui

The last named was Thami, and he changed his mind when France turned out to be the winner in this four-cornered fight. From the day the Protectorate was established, the Glaoui has been a loyal henchman of France, except for one slip in 1941 (now forgiven and forgotten) when he turned again to the Germans and placed one of his palaces at the disposal of the Nazi control commission passing through Marrakech.

In 1908, two of the Glaoua brothers, Thami and Madani, played an important part in the overthrow of Sultan Abd el-Aziz, who was succeeded by his half-brother, Moulay Hafid. In reward for his services, Thami was appointed Pasha of Marrakech by the new ruler, only to be dismissed a year later. He was reinstated as Pasha, in 1912, by the commander of the French forces in Southern Morocco, Colonel Mangin. The firm and durable friendship between the Glaoui and the French military dates from that year. Later, during World War I, the Glaoui made an important contingent of his troops available to the Allies, and he did so again in World War II—after the Allied landings in North Africa had put an end to his flirtation with the Nazis.

There was not much love lost between Thami and his elder brother, Madani. The former had been made Pasha of Marrakech by the French, but the latter continued as caid of the Glaoua tribe and head of the family. As the years passed, the rivalry between the two brothers grew more intense, and bitter recriminations were exchanged between them.

Gustave Babin quoted Madani as telling a friend: "You don't know my brother. He is rotten and ungrateful. He is a scoundrel. He is like a knife that may come in handy, but should be thrown away after using."

In 1918, Madani died—from natural causes, as far as anyone knows. But his body was hardly cold, before Thami seized and took over his brother's property and household, including his harem and slaves (for slavery, in one form or another, still is practiced in Morocco to this day, notwithstanding official protestations to the contrary). In doing so, he took from his 36 nephews and 28 nieces, the progeny of Madani's numerous wives and concubines, every penny of their heritage valued at nearly $1 million. What is more, it was also necessary to do away with a number of slaves, who had witnessed the spoliation, or attempted to save some property for the rightful heirs. The whole operation followed a message which Marshal Lyautey, the French Resident-General had sent to the Glaoui, after being apprised of Caid Madani's death: "You are head of the family now." Thus Thami, who had already enriched himself in six years of tenure as Pasha of Marrakech was able to add immeasurably to his wealth by appropriating his brother's estate and taking over the lucrative function of Caid of the Glaoua as well.

Since then, by many methods, the Pasha has become one of the richest men in the world. He is the biggest landowner in Morocco; his holdings extend for miles on both sides of the Atlas range. He owns stock in practically all important mining and industrial enterprises throughout Morocco. Not only every craftsman, trader, merchant or professional man in Marrakech, but also every one of the city's 4,000 prostitutes is forced to pay a fixed tithe that goes, not into any public treasury, but into the private till of the Pasha. The ragged tenants who cultivate his land holdings can sell their produce only to him and receive in return half the market price.

As Pasha of Marrakech, he receives a tribute of 100 francs a day per person from each of the 4,000-odd registered prostitutes under his jurisdiction. In addition, the Glaoui is a stockholder in a French-Moroccan combine which operates brothels in other parts of the country.

I HAVE before me, as I write this, the text of a letter addressed on July 7, 1953, to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Georges Bidault, by the President of the "Ligue des Droits de l'Homme" (French Civil Liberties Union), Dr. Sicard de Plauzoles, formally protesting against the opening at Fedala, a bathing resort near Casablanca, of a super-deluxe brothel. The letter points out that the inauguration of this establishment "coincides with the triumphal return to Morocco, after a rest cure in France, of the Pasha of Marrakech, principal stockholder of the consortium—(that is, the group that operates the Fedala brothel and others of the same kind). . . ."

In this protest—which, as far as is known, received no reply from M. Bidault—the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme also calls the Foreign Minister's attention to the resolution adopted on December 2, 1949, by the United Nations General Assembly in favor of the new draft Convention Against the White Slave Traffic and

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the Exploitation of Prostitution. France, it will be remembered, voted against this resolution and has so far refused to ratify the Convention, and for good reason, for the day it became applicable in the French Union, and in the Protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia, the Pasha of Marrakech, as well as a number of other prominent personalities would have to be arrested on charges of procuring.

For his personal pleasure, the Pasha, who is getting on to 80, maintains a harem of four legitimate wives and 50-odd concubines. He has, or had, seven legally recognized sons. The number of those not recognized, and of the Pasha's daughters in either category, has never been officially disclosed.

Once, at one of his lavish banquets, a French lady asked the Pasha how many children he had. After a moment of puzzled reflection, the Glaoui started counting on his fingers:

"Now, let's see, there is Brahim, and Abdessadek, and Hassan, and Ahmed and Mohammed, and Madani . . ." (the seventh of his legitimate sons was killed in World War II while serving with the French Army).

"No daughters?" the curious lady inquired. The Pasha merely shrugged his shoulders. It was beyond him how anybody could show any interest in so irrelevant a subject.

A STRIKING illustration of the Pasha's temper was given me by a Parisian who himself had witnessed the following scene a few years ago at one of the Glaoui's banquets: a woman servant tripped, spilling a bowl of sauce over the elaborate dress of a French lady sitting close to the Pasha. The Glaoui pulled a dagger out of his robe and slashed the servant's arm. The French lady fainted on the spot.

The Pasha not only likes to entertain in style at his palace in the Medinah at Marrakech, or at any of his many kasbahs and country houses; he also enjoys Paris, Deauville, Biarritz and the Riviera. His intimate friends range from Sir Winston Churchill to an assortment of stage and screen stars of every nationality.

If the Glaoui was universally disliked before, his plot against the Sultan, that led to the deposition of Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef, on August 20 of last year, aroused against him the implacable hatred of all classes of the Moroccan population. The nationalist "Istiqlal" have marked him for death and he knows that sooner or later the sentence will be executed.

His conflict with the Sultan dates back to 1950, when the latter for the first time began to press for revision of the Protectorate Treaty. The French colonials, scared by the rising tide of nationalism, made the Glaoui their standard-bearer. His formula for dealing with the nationalist leaders was "Hang 10 of them, and buy 50." The Sultan, indignant, showed him the door.

Since the beginning of this year, two attempts have been made to hasten the Glaoui's exit by means of hand grenades. Both, it is worthy of note, occurred in his own bailiwick, Marrakech, during the traditional Friday prayer at the mosque.

In the first attempt, which took place at the famous Koutoubia Mosque, on February 19, two of the Glaoui's retainers were killed and 26 injured, but he himself escaped harm.

The second attempt, on March 5, at the Berrima Mosque, was aimed both at the Glaoui and at "his" Sultan (Sidi Mohammed ben Arafa), who had come to Marrakech on a state visit.

Again, the Pasha went unscathed, while the Sultan suffered slight head injuries from the splinters of an exploding light grenade. The accounts of this event published in the world press—all based on official information—were wide of the mark in one important detail. According to these reports, the would-be assassin, a man named Mohamed ben Ali ben Mohamed, was caught in the act and executed on the spot by the Pasha's bodyguard.

This version is untrue. The fact is that nobody saw who tossed, or touched off, the grenade. In the ensuing confusion, the unfortunate Mohamed attracted attention by his incoherent behavior and frantic attempts to get out of the mosque which had been sealed off by guards. He was seized by Caid Brahim's men and held for questioning. A search produced nothing, but a small piece of a grenade was found not far from the spot where the man was arrested. That was all the evidence against him.

Meanwhile, the Glaoui had escorted the bleeding Sultan to his automobile. He later returned to the scene, clutching his submachine gun, which he carries on his person. His son tried to prevent him from entering the courtyard where Mohamed ben Ali was being questioned by detectives, crying out to the Chief of the French Security Police, "Stop him! He's mad." But the Glaoui pushed his son aside, burst into the courtyard and cut the helpless prisoner down with a burst from his gun. At this signal the guards also emptied their revolvers into the body of the dead man.

A FEW DAYS later, I was discussing the incident of the Berrima Mosque with a group of French and Moroccan friends. "There was not," I said, "a shred of evidence against Mohamed ben Ali. He was a suspect—no more. By the time the Glaoui came back to kill this man, more than an hour had elapsed since the grenade exploded. This was no act of self-defense, nor even instantaneous reprisal.

"The French have pledged themselves to uphold law and order in this country and to see that justice is done. The chief of the French Security Police was there. A murder was committed under his eyes. Why didn't he arrest the perpetrator of this crime—El Glaoui?"

There was a roar of laughter. My question proved to be the best joke in months.

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Northwest Bellwether

by George Sundborg

Juneau, Alaska

ADLAI STEVENSON was coming to Alaska, it had been announced in advance, for a rest. Whatever the trip was, it wasn't that. From the time he walked down the gangplank from the steamer *Princess Louise* until, 14 days and 2,500 miles later, he bounded up a ramp to the plane for the States, Stevenson was made to work like a man campaigning for office.

Alaskans had not met Adlai Stevenson previously, at least not in the way that Americans in general did during the 1952 campaign. The Territory had no television stations at that time (and has none now which is connected with networks in the States), so the Stevenson personality was something new.

Alaska, whose general election is held in October, has never failed since residents of the Territory first obtained the right to elect a Delegate to Congress in 1914, to show the way the national trend would go. In 1948, when Democrats scored a stunning upset victory in Alaska, observers said the role of Alaska as bellwether was ended, because of course Dewey was going to beat Truman in the nation. The rest of the political history of that campaign year is history indeed. In '52 Alaskans voted just as overwhelming Republican.

There are signs that Alaskans have made their own "agonizing reappraisal" of the Great Crusade. Democratic candidates attracted so many more voters than Republicans in the Territorial primary election last April that if voters go to the polls in the same mood in October they will choose Democrats for every Territorial office, for 18 of the 24 seats in the House and for all eight seats which are at stake in the Alaska Senate.

The principal dissatisfaction in Alaska comes with respect to the issue which Stevenson made the main subject of his inquiries. The platform adopted at the Republican National Convention in 1952 (like that of the Democrats) contained a plank supporting statehood for Alaska. Dwight Eisenhower, while he was still president of Columbia University, had said in a public address that "quick admission of Alaska and Hawaii to statehood will show the world that America practices what it preaches." The Republican performance on statehood has fallen so far short of the Republican promise that statehood is now dead for this session of Congress and, most Alaskans believe, for the Administration of Eisenhower. Stevenson had something to say about that:

> While I know President Eisenhower prefers Territorial status for defense and I must defer to his special competence in this field, it seems to me that a sparsely populated outpost, no matter how stoutly fortified, is a poor substitute for a vigorous, growing community of free men, dedicated to the defense of their homes and their country.

Part of the good impression which Stevenson made on Alaskans should be attributed to an assist he had from another distinguished visitor to the Territory. Douglas McKay, the Secretary of the Interior, landed at Anchorage the same day Adlai reached Juneau. They proceeded in opposite directions, Mr. McKay working in a broad circle toward Juneau and Ketchikan, while Mr. Stevenson swung toward Anchorage and the promised opportunity to go trout fishing.

THE CONTRAST was impressive. While Stevenson was charming the populace with his apt remarks about Alaska problems and making Alaskans feel their place in the world by talking on an even basis with them about the foreign policy matters which seemed to preoccupy him, Mr. McKay was saying things which had the Republicans wringing their hands. At Anchorage he told a group of statehood advocates who were pressing him for the Administration's support that, "I just get sick and tired of being kicked around by Alaskans. . . . Your people's attitude has to change. Get back down to earth. Start acting like ladies and gentlemen."

All Adlai had to do thereafter was start a speech with the customary "Ladies and gentlemen" to bring whoops of laughter and applause.

He had some fun too with references to a proposal made last Spring by Alaska Governor B. Frank Heintzleman, an Eisenhower appointee, that Alaska be partitioned and only the more southerly and more highly developed portion be admitted to statehood. Coming without warning and only a few days after a bill to admit all of Alaska had for the first time in history passed the United States Senate, the Heintzleman partition proposal was denounced everywhere in Alaska as a move to kill statehood in this session of Congress by confusing the issue. Whether that was the intention, that was certainly the result.

George Sundborg, managing editor of the Juneau Independent, *is the author of the recent book on Alaska,* Hail, Columbia.

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Between now and 1960, what must we do to assure full production and full employment each year?

A Program for Prosperity

This is the second of two articles presenting in summary form an analysis of our national economy by the Conference on Economic Progress,* a non-profit, non-political group engaged in economic research and education.

ALLOWING for taxes and for the portion of personal income that is saved, to lift consumption by about $20 billion would require that the annual rate of personal incomes before taxes be raised by about $25 billion.

About $4.5 billion of additional income could be provided consumers by tax legislation raising personal exemptions or combining a raise in exemptions with other progressive revisions in the income-tax structure weighted in favor of the lower income groups. Allowing for recent excise-tax reductions, the total impact would be more than $5 billion. However, if the international situation should require a lifting of federal outlays far in excess of the amount set forth above, some alternative combination of progressive tax changes would deserve consideration.

This $5 billion tax reduction would leave about $20 billion to go, in raising personal incomes. This could be done by:

1. Strengthening the farm price support program, plus other measures to alleviate rural poverty and to raise consumption and living standards of farm families.

2. A long-range program to raise the buying power of wage and salary employees outside of agriculture at a non-inflationary rate reflecting productivity change and the need to expand consumption. Because wage increases should not and cannot follow a uniform pattern in a free and flexible economy, this would require wage increases of various sizes through collective bargaining. To lift the buying power of unorganized and low income workers, the minimum wage should be raised very substantially.

3. Some part of the job of expanding consumer real incomes could be done by selective price adjustments, although the American experience indicates generally that increases in money incomes rather than decreases in prices contribute in a major way to maintenance of full employment and full production in a growing economy.

4. The balance of the needed increase in incomes would have to be achieved through reducing the true level of unemployment from about 5 million to about 1.5 million, and also through the employment of a million new workers entering the labor force—some in consequence of a growing population, others returning to the labor force as job opportunities appear. These employment trends should receive adequate stimuli from the modifications in federal expenditure and tax policy, as well as the adjustments in farm income, wages and salaries, and prices, as set forth above.

The task might be accomplished by correspondingly smaller increases in incomes, if the rate of personal saving could be reduced. This might be feasible in an improving economic climate, but the problem of reducing saving raises many issues of the distribution of income and of liquid assets. On the other hand, in the absence of tax reductions in the magnitude and of the kind recommended above, the increases through other methods in incomes available for spending would need to be correspondingly greater to restore full employment and full production.

If outlays by government and consumers expand sufficiently, it should not be difficult to maintain the annual rate of investment in new construction and producers' durable equipment at close to the present levels. Under this combination of circumstances, the high rate of in-

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* *National Committeemen advising the Conference include: Thurman Arnold, attorney, former US Asst. Attorney General, Judge of US Court of Appeals; Morris Llewellyn Cooke, construction engineer, former Administrator Rural Electrification Administration; William H. Davis, attorney, former Director Office of Economic Stabilization; Abraham Feinberg, Chairman Julius Kayser Co.; Richard H. Frost, executive Vice-President National Pneumatic Co.; A. J. Hayes, President International Association of Machinists; J. M. Kaplan, President Welch Grape Juice Co.; Leon H. Keyserling, economist and attorney, former Chairman President's Council of Economic Advisers; Murray D. Lincoln, President Farm Bureau Insurance Cos.; James G. Patton, President National Farmers Union; Miles Pennybacker, President Voltarc Tubes Inc.; Walter P. Reuther, President CIO; Marvin Rosenberg, Chairman Cameo Curtains Inc.; E. G. Shinner, merchant and banker, Chairman Shinner Foundation; M. W. Thatcher, President National Federation Grain Co-ops. The staff work was directed by Mr. Keyserling.*

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

ventory liquidation will be replaced by a satisfactory rate of inventory accumulation.

The main task in the investment area is to increase the annual rate of investment in new construction and producers' durable equipment by about $4.5 billion. This may not be easy. Moreover, if we want to come closer to our full potential for annual economic growth, which may be near 6 to 7 percent a year rather than 4.2 percent, we need direct policies for the expansion of our productive base. Wartime experience has shown how much these policies can yield. Some of the tax proposals recommended to the Congress by the President, such as the changes in loss carry-over provisions and in the treatment of depreciation, may require improvement in detail or additional safeguards against misuse; they soundly recognize that economic recovery and economic growth are more important than the immediate collection of revenues by the government. There are numerous other long-range improvements in the tax structure which should be considered from the standpoint of incentives. But direct expansion of consumption is of utmost urgency in the current economic situation. Lowering the personal income tax burden, especially as to low income families, will stimulate consumption. This will also do most to stimulate business investment through more ample markets.

There is immediate need, however, for the direct stimulation of investment in new construction. New non-farm housing starts this year have been running at an annual rate of 1.1 million, which is not much above the 1925 level and close to 20 percent below the 1950 level. To prevent traditional housing instability from contributing once again to economic instability, to keep up with population growth, and to bring our housing standards into line with our resources, we need, according to informed estimates, about 2 million new homes a year on the average between now and 1960. About 1¾ million new homes in the year ahead would provide about $4.5 billion of additional investment opportunity.

But we cannot again tolerate a thoughtless housing boom which contains the seeds of its own undoing by saturating the market. To prevent this, production must be adjusted to the income needs of the people. This requires at least 350,000 units per year of low-rent subsidized housing, with co-ordinate slum clearance undertaken as rapidly as possible without creating quantitative shortages. In addition, sound new methods must be devised to stimulate about 500,000 units per year of privately financed home building at costs suitable to the pocketbooks of middle income groups, who do not need subsidy but who still cannot afford to obtain a truly American standard of housing under conventional methods.

While we need more public works, they cannot substitute for a vastly expanded housing program. This is true whether the test be human needs, or the amount of demand for materials and manpower generated by every dollar spent, or the amount of private investment stimulated by every public dollar spent.

TO ENLARGE our economic transactions with the rest of the free world on a gradually self-sustaining basis, the first essential is to extend the authorization for reciprocal trade agreements along lines originally recommended by the President. We need also to enlarge the scope and size of technical assistance under the Point Four program; establish a better basis for aid to under-developed areas quite aside from technical assistance; and develop new methods to decrease the risks and thus increase the incentives in connection with the overseas investment of American private capital.

The $25 billion national economic deficit for the whole period from 1929 through 1940 was accompanied by an aggregate deficit of only about $27 billion in the federal budget. Besides, the national economic deficit represented an unmitigated loss to the American people, while the federal deficit represented instead the use of federal credit to help restore the economy. Probably if

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more vigorous measures had been taken immediately after 1933, and certainly if they had been taken immediately after 1929, a somewhat larger federal deficit would have enormously reduced the national economic deficit which totaled about $914 billion between 1929 and 1953.

Some noted economists believe that a moderate federal deficit in the years ahead, and a gradual rise in the national debt, is the best policy to pursue by deliberate choice. They believe that lower tax rates may be more beneficial to the economy than federal surpluses; and that a growth in the money supply and in liquid assets may encourage sound economic growth.

While this may be debatable, it is not debatable that federal deficits feed upon national economic deficits. Similarly, a full employment and full production economy tends to promote a balanced federal budget, except under conditions of total war or when defense outlays are rising rapidly toward abnormal peaks in a period of mobilization short of total war. Despite the high costs of the Korean War, there was a net surplus in the federal budget for the whole period from the fiscal year 1947 through the fiscal year 1952.

IF FULL employment and full production are restored by the first quarter of next year, the federal deficit, even with the increased federal expenditures and the reduced taxes suggested in this discussion, would be at an annual rate at least $2 billion lower than it would be at the current level of national output with the tax changes thus far proposed by the Executive Branch of the government. And, if through neglect of necessary restorative action, there should be a further decline of 5 percent in economic activity by the first quarter of next year, the federal deficit would be at an annual rate at least $6 billion higher than if the combination of tax and expenditure policies recommended in this discussion were used along with other measures to restore full employment and full production.

For the period from the first quarter of 1953 to the fourth quarter of 1960 as a whole, there is likely to be a more rapid growth in productivity than in recent years, and thus a more rapid rise in the level of total output required for full employment and full production than 4.2 percent a year. Huge investment in capital equipment since 1950 has already advanced the rate of productivity growth far beyond earlier rates or earlier expectations. This type of investment is continuing almost unslackened, and the effects upon pr tivity are likely to be cumulative.

Industrial research is expanding. A ne science is constantly evolving, quite apart from the ind rial utilization of atomic energy. A full economy, if achieved and maintained, will in itself quicker the impulses which tend to accelerate the rate

Between now and 1960, ur revise our standards of leisure, an annual growth rate of 6-7 percent seems much more nearly in line with what we need to achieve to prevent rising unemployment, than an annual growth rate of 4.2 percent. We should now begin to adjust our thinking and our action to these larger magnitudes. The longer we lag in this readjustment, the more difficult our task may become.

Nonetheless, this study throughout adheres to the very conservative 4.2-percent figure. This has some advantages: it may awaken more people to the vast magnitude of our problems and possibilities, by stating them in minimum terms which are more likely to go unchallenged.

Utilizing this low figure, and comparing at annual rates the first quarter of 1953 with the fourth quarter of 1960, our total national output can grow in real terms from about $364 billion to about $500 billion, personal consumption expenditures from about $228 billion to about $330 billion, and private domestic investment from about $55 billion to about $75 billion. Net foreign investment should rise from a negative rate of $2.1 billion to a positive rate of about $5 billion. A growth in government purchases of goods and services from about $83.5 billion to about $90 billion, in order to serve the growing needs of a growing nation, would in view of an expanding higher national income permit a reduction of perhaps 20 percent in tax rates.

Over the same span of time, annual farm income could grow from about $32 billion to about $42 billion, corporate profits before taxes from $45 billion to about $57 billion, and compensation of employees from about $205 billion to about $297 billion. The average weekly earnings of production workers in manufacturing could advance from $71.50 to about $100, and their yearly earnings at full-time employment from about $3,575 to about $5,000. The average standard of living, or consumption per household, could be elevated about 35 percent.



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Another gain that we can achieve by the end of 1960 is the virtual liquidation of poverty in the United States. In 1950, 57 percent of all American families had incomes of less than $4,000 a year. There were 39 percent below $3,000, and 23 percent below $2,000. To bring all of these families up to a $4,000 standard of living would absorb less than half of the total increase in personal incomes that we can register by 1960, thus leaving ample room for income improvement among other families.

Measured against these capabilities, there would be enormous losses if through periodic deviations from full employment and full production we should achieve in the aggregate during the whole period under discussion only the equivalent of a steady 2.5 percent annual rate of growth, instead of a steady 4.2 percent annual rate. Measured in uniform 1953 prices, this would involve a loss of about $220 billion in total national output; about $142 billion in the enjoyment of personal consumption; about $33 billion in opportunity for private domestic investment; about $127 billion in compensation to employees; about $23 billion in corporate profits before taxes; and about $17 billion in farm income. The aggregate loss of employment opportunity would come to about 32.5 million man years, with a corresponding excess of unemployment.

An aggregate national economic deficit of $220 billion, from 1953 through 1960, would in uniform dollars be almost 35 percent of the $635 billion national economic deficit that we suffered between 1929 and 1940 in consequence of the Great Depression; and on a yearly comparison, the loss would be almost 53 percent as big. And this loss would not require another "depression." It could result even if all the years from 1953 through 1960 were "fairly prosperous," instead of maintaining full employment and full production year by year.

WHAT are the basic economic responsibilities of government, as we move forward in the second half of the Twentieth Century toward these 1960 goals?

It should shape its fiscal policies with the paramount objective of maintaining a full economy, even when this means abandonment of the idea that small Treasury deficits are worse than huge national economic deficits. Moreover, the federal budget can be kept closest to balance in a balanced American economy.

It should encourage a flexible and expanding money and credit supply, learning from hard experience that "hard money" promotes hard times. To do this may require some gradual enlargement of the national debt, though relative to the size of a growing economy the debt "burden" can be reduced.

It should push forward with resource development, power projects, health and education services, and housing, on the expanding scale which an expanding economy needs and can afford. In order to achieve a $500 billion economy by 1960, the index of agricultural production, which stood at 107 in 1953, must rise to 130; the index of industrial production must rise from 134 to 170; the index of productivity for the economy as a whole must rise from 192 to 234. These gains cannot occur unless government interests itself sufficiently in the material and human resources upon which the expansion of enterprise depends.

It should improve the farm price support program, and adopt many supplementary measures to help lift agricultural income even more than other incomes. This is necessary because the farmer, being disadvantageously placed in the economy, has lagged behind for years through no fault of his own.

It should concentrate especially upon improving the lot of low income families, by adequate minimum wage legislation, and by a wide range of stimuli to the underdeveloped areas where a large part of American poverty is located.

THROUGH the expansion of social security, it should by 1960 lift the average basic retirement incomes of elderly people to 4 to 5 times the current average level. As our technology moves forward by leaps and bounds, we may increasingly find it desirable to enjoy a larger portion of an increased standard of living in the form of more leisure, rather than in the form of more material goods. Sensible enlargement of the opportunity to retire at an earlier age, without compulsion, can increase the scope of recreational and cultural enjoyments, and generate new forms of demands for goods and services as our economy gains more and more productive power in excess of that required to feed and clothe and house and transport the population. Systematic retirement programs can thus serve as a sort of economic gyroscope to help very substantially in the stabilization of the whole economy.

The government should expand unemployment insurance, so that any temporary failure to maintain full employment does not excessively restrict consumption and thus retard the whole economy.

It should perform a variety of regulatory activities to prevent economic abuse and exploitation; maintain basic standards of fair play and truth in economic affairs; and discourage monopolistic or coercive practices. At the same time, the government should carefully re-examine whether the more skillful economic management of what it needs to do can be accompanied by a pruning away of superfluous, inconsistent or overlapping public regulation of economic affairs in detail. The government should work with industry, agriculture and labor, not only to define the inescapable obligations of government, but also to define what others can do better if the government helps to preserve a generally favorable economic [illegible]onment.

Th[illegible]nment should also define and lead in the

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fulfilment of our responsibility to help uplift economic conditions in other parts of the free world.

And, of course, it must provide for the national security, unfettered by the dangerous shibboleths of false economy.

Another task of government, which looms above any of these specifics, is set forth in the core mandate of the Employment Act of 1946 that there shall be defined each year the needed levels of employment, production and purchasing power consistent with maximum economic stability and growth.

Without this frame of reference, there is no way to match national economic policies against national economic objectives, or to evaluate what blend of programs in what proportion can form parts of a consistent program. And without it, the powerful competing interests in our economy—industry, agriculture and labor—cannot be brought to see that their long-range unity of interests are more vital than their short-range points of divergence. The Employment Act stresses that the Council of Economic Advisers should assume leadership in this field through regular and systematic conferences.

For all of these purposes, it would be well to consider the development and popularization of a National Prosperity Budget, to see not only what we cannot afford, but more important what we can enjoy; not only what we must avoid, but more important what we can achieve; not only what we must work against, but more important what we can work for; not only what we need not irrationally fear, but more important what we can with reason hope for. This National Prosperity Budget would have none of the compulsions of the "planned economies." Voluntarily formulated and pursued by the processes of a free government and a free people, we could move toward the promise of America at whatever pace and by whatever methods the American people prefer.



THE ACTIONS of government, as all experience from 1929 to 1954 proves, cannot sufficiently stabilize and expand the American economy, unless our enterprise system also does its part—and in fact carries most of the load because we live in that kind of economy and want to keep it that way.

Our enterprise system should adjust its investment goals to the needs of a full economy, unrestrained by the superstitious fear of periodic depression which can be generated by these very fears.

It should gear production and profits, prices and wages, to the consumption needs of an expanding economy, and thus serve itself best in the long run by helping to maintain full production and full employment.

It should reach out for a constant improvement of the relationships among industry, agriculture and labor. This depends in part upon improved machinery, but far more upon advancing the frontiers of economic understanding.

It should lend its support to wholesome public policies.

It should build constructively upon the noteworthy gains that it has always made, toward understanding even better how our economy works, and toward recognition that human well-being is our largest economic asset.

Any full definition of enterprise includes practically everybody, whether as a producer or as a consumer; and practically everybody, as a citizen, can influence public policies.

In the long run, the degree of the economic literacy of the American people at large will shape the course of our economy. This imposes upon all a responsibility to learn, and upon many a responsibility to teach and to persuade. In domestic no less than in world affairs, we may be in an ultimate race between understanding and destruction.

Copies of the full report of the Conference on Economic Progress can be obtained for 25c by writing to its office: 1001 Conn. Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C.

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GERALD W. JOHNSON

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The Superficial Aspect

PERHAPS there are under the surface deep mysteries that explain the pained bewilderment of our public comment on the affair of Indo-China, but superficially it seems as easy to understand why France left Indo-China as why Friar John quit the monastery. There were seven reasons, he explained, the first being that he was thrown out. Nobody listened to the others.

We, on the other hand, prefer listening to all the others while shutting our ears to the first. Some of our pundits have elaborated a theory that Geneva was another Munich with Mendès-France playing the role of Neville Chamberlain. The fact that Munich was at one end of a war and Geneva at the other is ignored, as is the fact that Czechoslovakia was willing to fight and Indo-China is not, unless, indeed it fights for the invader.

WITHOUT doubt, one reason for the desperate efforts to find some way of accounting for the situation other than an admission that the French were licked is that the admission entails a sharp reduction in our estimate of our own moral superiority. We had announced loudly that the Communists must be stopped at "the bottle-neck" and that we were going to help stop them, and the announcement made not the slightest impression upon the Communists. They assumed that our words were a mouthful of wind and proceeded as if we had never spoken; and events justified them.

This could not have happened to a nation whose moral superiority is recognized by all the world, but it is bound to happen to any nation that is once caught betting on a pair of treys. If the new Administration had told the French in unmistakable terms back in January, 1953, that it was going to risk no more Koreas, we might not have saved the French, but we would have saved face and when the end came we might have been able to exert some sort of influence upon the course of events.

Mr. Dulles did not "lose" Indo-China any more than Mr. Acheson "lost" China; but Mr. Dulles was not one whit better than Mr. Acheson at preventing the disaster. This is a fact that we are extremely reluctant to face, but it will not go away because we shut our eyes to it.

There is no evidence that Russia ever gave the Chinese Communists anything like as much aid as we gave Chiang Kai-shek, and no evidence that the Chinese gave Viet-Minh as much aid as we gave France. Yet in both cases our side lost in spite of its material superiority.

As a mere outside observer, utterly ignorant of high politics, this writer clings stubbornly to the conviction that we do, in fact, have a very decided moral superiority over Communist ideology; but that belief makes inevitable the inference that we have not brought it to bear since we lost in two fields in which we had material superiority to begin with.

Yet the slightest inquiry into why we have failed to employ our best weapon in this struggle leads to embarrassment. The reason is definitely internal politics. But that leads to the question, can a nation that blinds itself to world realities in the squabble over who shall hold office lay claim to any moral superiority at all?

Not a single Russian infantryman has been killed, unless by accident, in the wars that have extended Communist influence in Asia: Communism has advanced by offering the semblance of economic as well as political freedom to oppressed people. The obvious way to stop it was to offer the reality of freedom to the same people; but to do that would have interfered with countless diplomatic and business arrangements throughout the world. More, and from the standpoint of reactionary Americans, worse, it would have afforded aid and comfort to battlers for social justice at home.

SO WE have laid aside the weapon of moral suasion and have relied on nuclear fission instead. So China has gone, Indo-China is going, and India stands perplexed. The Hindu is not impressed by the moral superiority either of the hydrogen bomb or of a tariff to protect the makers of timing devices for the bomb. He may be impressed by the moral superiority of a system that can win wars because alien people are willing to fight for it.

If India goes, the rest of Asia is pretty sure to go with it; and if Asia goes the bomb may, indeed, become our last hope and a slim one, because Russia has it, too. Too much faith in military and too little in moral force may end by costing us a dozen of our biggest cities, to say nothing of our lives, our fortunes and our sacred honor.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

New Times, New Values

by Malcolm Cowley

FOR A LONG time we have been hearing echoes of a complaint that was made by John Aldridge in his book about postwar fiction, *After the Lost Generation.* Most of the echoers and complainers are young novelists who are dissatisfied with their work. They say, as Aldridge said, that it is impossible to write good novels today because we are living in a society uniquely lacking in values.

It seems to me that the complaint is by no means new and that the first authors who made it are now buried and forgotten, or revered. These older men, it is true, didn't use the collective plural "values," which is an invention of recent sociologists. Instead they spoke of lost ideals, illusions, faith, belief, standards, piety or conviction, but what they meant was exactly the same. The world was changing for them as it has always changed, and with it the ideals or the sense of life of each new generation.

FOR A CENTURY or more the change has been more rapid. We might say that the acceleration began with the French Revolution or the Industrial Revolution, or perhaps it began in 1859, when Darwin published *The Origin of Species.* Many young Englishmen of the 1860's had an even more desperate sense of being lost, unguided, left without standards of judgment, than American novelists have today. It seemed to them that the moral world had collapsed with the first statement of the principle that men, instead of being specially created in God's image and guided at every step by divine providence, were descended from lower animals and subject to the indifferent laws of the physical world. Yet some of the young Englishmen wrote novels, and good ones, about a society that now seems to us remarkably stable, self-assured, and rich in values.

Darwinism as interpreted by Huxley, Tyndall and Spencer had a destructive effect on the faith or standards of young American novelists in the 1890's. Theodore Dreiser, for example, read these authors when he was in Pittsburgh working as a young reporter on the *Dispatch.* He tells us that all of them, but especially Herbert Spencer's *First Principles,* "quite blew me, intellectually, to bits." He had rebelled against his pious father, but without quite forsaking his father's world. In the second volume of his memoirs, *Newspaper Days,* he says:

> Hitherto, until I had read Huxley, I had some lingering filaments of Catholicism trailing about me, faith in the existence of Christ, the soundness of His moral and sociological deductions, the brotherhood of man. But on reading . . . *First Principles* and discovering all I deemed substantial—man's place in nature, his importance in the universe, this too, too solid earth, man's very identity save as an infinitesimal speck of energy or a "suspended equation" drawn or blown here and there by larger forces in which he moved quite unconsciously as an atom—all questioned and dissolved into other and less understandable things, I was completely thrown down in my conceptions or non-conceptions of life.

Dreiser, had he been living today, would have said that he had been deprived of all values, yet he managed to get his novels written and found new values to express. In his last novel, *The Bulwark,* which is like an unfinished scenario for what might have been his greatest work, he almost completed the circle from alienation or rebellion to reintegration. He didn't become reconciled with his father's church, but he did try to explain, even to celebrate, the father's religious sense of life.

IT WOULD seem that every generation in turn starts with this feeling of lost values, as if it were a necessary step in education. I can remember coming down the steps of Widener Library one morning in the early spring of 1917. I looked out at the leafless elms in the hard sunlight, and the duckboards still in place along the walks, and found myself saying compulsively, "It was all lies, everything they told me at home, everything they taught me at school." I can remember too that I found comfort in the statement; it wasn't so much the wail of a little boy deserted in the night as a sort of incantation and a first step toward seeking the truth, wherever it might still be found.

Later I decided that the statement wasn't so meaningful, even for myself, as it had seemed in the bleak sunlight of that New England morning. I didn't really believe that everything taught me in school was a lie, or I would also have questioned what I was learning in college and wouldn't have continued to study hard in the hope of making A's and winning another scholarship that would help me to study harder. What I really meant was that I couldn't any longer accept what I had been told about some important matters—such as sex, primarily, but also God, the hereafter, patriotism, right living, and the American ideal of success.

ALL OVER the country in that year boys like myself were making similar discoveries as they walked down library steps. Later they would be called the lost generation. It is true that they suffered from a feeling of loss or alienation or deception, but it didn't interfere with their writing novels if they had talent enough to write them. What they would reaffirm in the novels was a number of very old and simple values—in Hemingway, for example, these were courage, love, drinking and the obligations of one's craft or métier; in Faulkner they were pride, courage again, compassion and love of earth; in all the leading novelists of their age group the values were intended to be fundamental, down-to-rock, and thereby fitted to survive. It was as if these writers had watched many high systems of judgment collapse around them and had afterward tried to build humbler and, so they felt, solider structures in the rubble.

Now the process of losing and finding values seems to be starting over with another postwar generation—and why shouldn't it start? The depressing feature of Aldridge's complaint, and that of the young novelists who echo him, is that this time it *is* a complaint and not even subconsciously a boast or an incantation or a program for rebuilding.

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The new demand for pre-existing values in the moral world seems to correspond with the new demand for security in the economic world. Just as students who plan to go into business say that they want stable employment with a big corporation and an income of ten thousand a year—not too large, but dependable—so the young novelists would like to start out with an income-bearing capital of values that would be like securities listed on a moral stock exchange. They complain like the children of a bankrupt family—but perhaps the bankruptcy isn't complete and the values are there, if the novelists would look for them.

IN SIMPLE FACT there has never been a society or a new generation without values. Some of these, like food, shelter, sex, rest, are imposed on us biologically. Other values are imposed on us by the nature of human groups and—as Kenneth Burke has pointed out—by the general nature of language, which helps to determine group judgments. Of this second type are personal values like courage and prudence in varying proportions, loyalty to the group, integrity of the person, and the ability to get along with others. The emphasis changes from one era to another—for example, the prudent man is now preferred to the courageous man—but the values themselves are permanent.

There is also a third type of values, impermanent by definition, that are associated with particular societies. These are values in the sociological sense of the word—that is, they are ideals, customs, institutions, and social ranks or functions, toward which the people of the group have an affective or emotional regard. New values of this sort always take the place of old ones that are lost. New and old they hold a society together; if it had no such values of its own it would cease to exist as a society.

It seems to me that the lives of present-day Americans are rich in all three sorts of values—biological, personal or moral, and social or institutional—as well as in esthetic values that include elements of the other three. The problem is how to find and express the values, how to choose and reaffirm the best of them, and that is a problem for the novelists themselves, along with the poets and dramatists and critics. Aren't that finding, that choice, and that reaffirmation three functions which writers in the past have always helped to perform? What do the new writers expect, after all? To find new thresholds, new anatomies, and at the same time retain the values they absorbed with their mothers' milk? To be great explorers of the soul, like Melville and Baudelaire, and at the same time to be respected citizens, academic dignitaries, and vestrymen of the Protestant Episcopal Church?

IT IS TRUE that the new novelists have a special reason for their feelings of deprivation. Just as many young Englishmen of the 1860's, and young Americans two or three decades later, lost their faith in a divine providence that watches over the human species, so these others have lost their faith in progress, whether automatic or directed by human intelligence, and along with that faith have lost the old American conviction that most people are good and that evil is merely an accident. But the loss might well be their opportunity as writers, instead of being a handicap; it might launch them on the effort to speak for a new age as other writers spoke for the past.

An Astounding Man

COMPLETION of the eight-volume edition of Theodore Roosevelt's letters almost simultaneously with publication of Mr. Hagedorn's charming reminiscences of life on Sagamore Hill may come to be regarded as marking the moment when this Roosevelt was placed in his permanent niche in American history. Neither the letters nor the reminiscences add materially to our stock of factual knowledge, but they contribute heavily to our understanding; for while the statesman stands just about where he stood before these volumes were published, the man is three-dimensional to an extent that he never was before, and the man seems likely to outlast the statesman.

The Days of Armageddon: The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Volumes VII and VIII, edited by Eltinge E. Morison (Harvard; $20 the set).
The Roosevelt Family of Sagamore Hill, by Hermann Hagedorn (Macmillan; $5).

The fact that it has taken approximately 50 years to catalogue the first Roosevelt is an interesting and none too flattering commentary on the intellectual climate of this republic. For he is not a difficult psychological study; he was about as complex as a ramrod, as subtle as a steam calliope and understanding him presents no real problem. What we have not been able to understand is history, which presented this man in a role for which our rules make no provision.

We have perforce conceded that some personalities have overshadowed the Presidential office. Jackson and Lincoln are examples. We have had to concede, too, that some men have gained more permanent fame outside the White House than in it. Jefferson, Madison, Grant and Taft come to mind at once and there may be another case in the making at this moment. What we have not been able to grasp is that a man may be tremendous in the White House, yet not as Chief Magistrate; which is why we have found no pigeonhole for Theodore Roosevelt.

The most recently published volumes cover the period from 1909 to 1919, that is to say, after Roosevelt's Presidency, but they do not change the picture to any substantial degree. The general tone of the letters is remarkably consistent from the first volume to the last, and no reader can dip into them for as much as an hour without realizing that here was an extraordinary, indeed an astounding man.

Nevertheless, in the perspective of fifty years it is evident that Theodore Roosevelt's impact upon our political history was rather less than that of Rutherford B. Hayes. Roosevelt never did anything as important, politically, as Hayes' consignment of the South to white supremacy for more than seventy-five years. Yet the historian who would seriously contend that Hayes is the more important figure would not be deemed rational.

The historians' embarrassment is perhaps attributable to their Christian upbringing, which commits them to the theory that the incidence of the avatar is a heathenish idea and unconstitutional. Yet the eight volumes of the letters are massive proof that this man's life was an almost perfect demonstration of an ideal that has had many incarnations. It is the ideal of the Paladin, a man of princely lineage dedicated to the one purpose of putting down evil *vi et armis.* When his uproar first impinged upon their ears the American

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people responded like Chesterton's Mahound:

> It is Richard, it is Raymond, it is Godfrey at the gate!

The ideal of the Paladin is, of course, the creation of an immature culture; as we grow wiser and sadder we realize that to smite the wicked is not enough to assure establishment of the good. But to the boyish mind, whether in a body of nine or ninety years, Arthur and Roland, Coeur de Lion and Bayard are all-sufficient.

Emotionally, Theodore Roosevelt never developed beyond this point, although intellectually he developed the hard practicality that made him a superb politician. The prosaic, with no comprehension of the romantic temperament, promptly dubbed him hypocrite; but if life is a game, morality consists in playing according to the established rules, which is why Roosevelt could claim to be a defender of "the old moralities" without a taint of hypocrisy.

From start to finish, the dominant motif of the letters is *noblesse oblige*, and the obligation of nobility is to cut down the wicked. Thunderous in the admonitions to the sons, it may be muted elsewhere, but it is always present in the delightful whimsicalities based on family jokes; and it is presented with a clarity that occasionally rises into high eloquence that could sweep along not young boys, only, but highly sophisticated men as well.

Whatever else may be said of Theodore Roosevelt, he was the most prodigiously successful father since Abraham, and anyone who thinks that is faint praise has never tried it. To say nothing of energy, it calls for wisdom and grace with which few men are endowed.

Gloomy modern sociologists insist that the few are becoming fewer, whence come juvenile delinquency and countless other evils that now beset us; so it is arguable that presentation of these letters as a stately monument to Paternity may be one of the happiest literary achievements of our times.

Yet one hesitates to recommend them to any man above the age of fifty, for reading them is likely to give him the feeling that he is not merely among the Elder Statesmen but coeval with the igneous rocks, so great has been the revolution in our thinking since 1900. To illustrate the point by a rather trivial citation, consider what Mencken called Roosevelt's "striated muscle complex." It was accepted without question then that vigorous physical exercise was conducive to health, even when the President compelled corpulent generals to mount and ride twenty miles a day.

With our improved knowledge of the cardio-vascular system we can easily believe that Roosevelt with his strenuosity may have purged more Very Important Persons than Stalin did with his tyranny. Roosevelt himself died at sixty-one, having shattered his health by a trip into South American jungles.

This is only one article of a credo that in many respects seems as antiquated as the criminal code of Elizabeth the First; yet it was accepted by millions of men who are still living. It raises a spectral question—will the year 2000 look back upon the mid-century as the mid-century looks back upon 1900, that is, with a mild astonishment that men could have believed such imbecilities?

It is a dismal thought, yet it may have some value in inducing a becoming modesty.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

Barriers to Free Trade

ECONOMISTS have been busily proving for the last century and three-quarters that free international trade—unimpeded movement of commodities, men, and money across international boundaries—would increase the output and the income of all the trading partners. During this entire period, their argument, (whatever the complications of its formulation), has started and ended with specialization. For specialization within a country increases output by subdivision of process, increased speed of individual operation, wider employment of machinery, and reduction of waste motion. Specialization between countries permits profitable exploitation of each country's natural advantages whether in the form of plentiful natural resources, favorable climate, heritage of skills and technical knowledge, or industrious population. Where world trade is free, both Argentina and England are the better off because the former concentrates on beef and grain and the latter on coal and equipment, and the same is true of many other relationships between industrial and agricultural societies.

Trade, Aid, or What?, by Willard L. Thorp (Johns Hopkins; $4.50).

The case for free trade has always run in such terms. And certainly the network of restrictions which has increasingly circumscribed trade among the nations has fostered much inefficiency and much absurdity. An example cited by Professor Thorp occurred in the postwar period. For some time Swedes could purchase typewriters and printing equipment in England but not in Sweden and Englishmen could acquire these same items in Sweden but not in their own country. Both nations had been so eager to promote exports that they had banned domestic sales. Presumably the only beneficiaries of this policy were the merchant marines of the two countries and writers and reviewers of books like this one. Our sugar quotas encourage high cost production of sugar beets and French economic policy encourages French farmers to produce so much wine that alcoholism has become a grave social problem. Americans fear the threat to our way of life represented by Danish blue cheese, English briar pipes, and Swiss watch movements. And so it has gone.

But a puzzle remains. If the economic arguments for free or, at least, freer trade are overwhelming—and this is one of the few subjects upon which economists are in general agreement—why does no country, the United States included, really like this policy? Why are all nations protectionists in fact if not in profession? In this report of a conference of foreign trade experts held last summer, Professor Thorp notes some of the explanations. The most obvious stem from the effects of the two World Wars upon the United States and Europe. These wars seriously weakened Europe in a variety of ways: investments were sold, markets and colonies lost, physical assets destroyed. At the same time, they tremendously strengthened the United States by expanding our markets, enlarging our investments, and increasing our physical plant. In a phrase—an economist's phrase—large structural changes altered the course of world trade and the economies of trading nations.

These structural changes included

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English loss of markets for coal and textiles, Japanese loss of silk exports and many other drastic events of this nature. Now, the free trade answer to the problems faced by English workers and capitalists as their livelihoods slipped away was a cheerful reliance upon shifts of capital and labor into more remunerative occupations. But surely in a modern democracy, it is too much to expect that a government will calmly sit on its hands while "resources shift," two words which conceal unemployment, decaying communities, and social disruption.

The answer of the popular government is protection and the varied forms protection has taken are described in horrifying detail in this book: tariffs, quotas, exchange controls, sanitary regulations, weird and interminable customs procedures, and export subsidies among others. In other words, free trade for most of Europe is unbearable because, whatever its long run benefits, in the short run it means personal disaster to substantial numbers of people. Two World Wars have greatly intensified the pressure for protection against such disasters.

It is less clear why we in this country are protectionist, for we are so much more efficient in so many ways than our major rivals that complete removal of our tariffs unilaterally would do us very little harm and do our allies a rather large amount of good.

In this lucid and illuminating book, a number of explanations appear. Our special interests are vocal and politically persuasive, as their success in persuading the President to raise the tariff on Swiss watch movements indicates. Often what they are protecting is high profits rather than their share of the market, but no law of human behavior suggests that activity is less strong in support of the first objective than of the second. Nor have we assimilated our role as the world's principal creditor nation, obligated morally at least to accept payment in goods.

Moreover, we continue to be geared to the concept of reciprocal concession which in present circumstances is not a realistic policy. For Europe to take more of our goods in exchange for increased sales to us is simply to preserve lack of balance at a higher level of trade.

The need of the moment is determined leadership from a courageous and enlightened administration. No evidence exists that this administration's supply of these essentials is large enough to support good domestic, let alone international, policies. What is sadly more plausible is a continuation of uncertainty in our trade policy. No other nation can be sure from year to year whether reciprocal trade programs will continue, whether our various escape clauses will be invoked, or whether we will simply refuse to play. Dim morality from the White House is a poor substitute for clear economic thinking and direct political action.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN

A Gloomy Prophecy

DR. BROWN, a brilliant young geochemist at the California Institute of Technology, is concerned like many other men about the fact that world population is increasing so much faster than world food resources (seven times faster in recent years, according to one careful estimate). Modern public-health methods have been applied to areas

The Challenge of Man's Future, by Harrison Brown (Viking; $3.75).

where most of the world's population lives, causing death-rates to drop materially—in some cases 65 or 70 percent, while in these same areas birth-rates have declined little or not at all. The result is that the population of the world, which was roughly 2.4 billion in 1950, may be as much as 6.7 billion a century from now. Already, half the people on this globe live in a continuous state of semi-starvation, and another 20 percent have barely enough food for minimum nutritional requirements. A good example, or a rather bad one, of what is happening is India. Her population is at or below a bare subsistence level; yet the number is increasing by about five million a year, and every attempt to improve the condition of the people is swallowed up by the remorseless avalanche of babies.

Modern science, which created this dilemma, is also capable of solving it. If we learned to cultivate yeasts and algae, eat plankton and other edible things from the sea, and to adopt every other possible means of expanding our food, the world might eventually support a population of 50 billion people. Even modest ameliorative efforts could improve the outlook; Dr. Brown thinks that a mere $30 billion would serve to bring up the worst half of the world's soil to minimum adequacy. Worldwide industrialization would be desirable for several reasons. Assuming that the skilled labor and the physical resources were available—a big assumption indeed—this would cost about $3.6 trillion, but a start could be made with a mere $600 billion. If the United States paid three-quarters of this sum, which would be in line with our proportion of world resources, we could do it with $4 or $5 billion annually for 50 years or so. Nobody who is in favor of unrestricted population growth—as so many people are—can logically argue against such an expenditure.

Dr. Brown is not optimistic about our ability to get the "explosion of population" under control. He thinks that resistance to birth control on religious, political and sentimental grounds makes it unlikely that any such intelligent scheme as worldwide limitation of population will be accepted. He argues that the industrialization of the last couple of centuries came about because of altogether special factors that are unlikely to recur.

Most probable, he believes, is a return to worldwide agrarianism with a low standard of living and a total population of not more than five billion. The second most probable course would be a single highly collectivized totalitarianism. A very poor third is the chance of a continued free society.

It will be seen that Dr. Brown's book follows the general pattern of such well-known writers as Fairfield Osborn, William Vogt and Robert Cook. It is superior to any other that I have seen in the mass of compact information it contains, especially in the field of nutrition for which Dr. Brown's scientific training particularly qualifies him. His book contains more than 30 useful charts and diagrams, and a good, informal bibliography.

I happen to agree with him that this is the most pressing of all long-range problems, and I should be happy if his book could be translated into 100 languages and sold by the million. Unfortunately, and in spite of its clarity and brilliance, I am sure this won't happen. Mankind doesn't care about its own future that much, if at all.

BRUCE BLIVEN

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FILMS

IT IS A RARE pleasure to recapture our early wonder at the movies. We have grown accustomed to effortless immersion in the worlds depicted on the screen. We are easily engrossed—too easily, as we follow mere habits of escape acquired in years of going to the movies. But once in a while, a few films arrive which recreate the old magic, imbuing visions of other times and places with a heady accuracy that is of the essence of the truth creatively imagined to be true—and we are carried away like Sinbad on the Roc's back.

When the films themselves are made abroad, the exotic fascination is doubled, and the credibility of fancy is enhanced. *The Earrings of Madame De,* for example, comes from France, directed by Max Ophuls, who made *La Ronde* and *Le Plaisir.* Ophuls' last concern is mere realism, and yet his evocation of life in the Parisian *haute-monde* in the 1890's is marvelously vivid. Not only are the decor, the costumes, and the outward manners of the actors in meticulous accordance with our best knowledge of the age—(except, perhaps, for a modern aversion to beards). These superficialities only embed the deeper precision of the characters, who are incarnated, rather than acted, by Charles Boyer, Danielle Darrieux, and Vittorio de Sica.

The story itself seems a late-Victorian trifle, about a flirtation that becomes serious, hung on a succession of coincidences involving a pair of earrings. But the inevitable duel at the close has a fatal ending, and the frivolous lady, who was for once enmeshed by her outrageous coquetry, is left dying—while the camera ironically cuts to her earrings, given as a last, despairing offering in a church. Irony is the film's message—but even this is but a part of the film.

The performances are masterpieces of characterization. Again one realizes how wasted Boyer was in Hollywood, and that de Sica's reputation as an actor was not blown up by any publicity mill. Ophuls' direction and dynamic editing of the superbly animated camera work reveal the various personalities, tell the story, and recreate an age with an economy sadly rare. He knows that sophistication at its best is not snobbishness, though it may leave some behind, but a frugality of expression that is subtly eloquent.

Luis Bunuel is best known for transporting audiences into fantastic, surrealistic worlds on the screen—as in *Un Chien Andalou,* or *L'Age d'Or,* which he made with Salvador Dali. Two years ago, however, his *The Young and the Damned,* realistically treating Mexico City's slums and underworld, reminded us that he was more than an experimentalist with appeal only to *avant-garde* film enthusiasts. And at present, we are able to see his extraordinary abilities in *Robinson Crusoe,* a wholly admirable evocation of the story and spirit of the Defoe classic, and in the new *Mexican Bus Ride*—retitled from *Subido al Cielo.* Here he deals with a simple story of simple people in a way that is characteristically Latin, juxtaposing comic observations on a situation that is fundamentally and imminently tragic.

In a remote Mexican village, a young man is torn from his bride on their wedding-night. His mother is dying, and justly fears that his two elder brothers are seeking to cheat her infant grandson—the young man's nephew—of his inheritance. In a desperate race against time, the young man starts out for a distant city to reach a lawyer, while his mother tries to stay alive long enough to see justice done. The body of the film simply follows his journey in the rickety old bus that serves the neighborhood, stopping briefly for vignettes of this or the other passenger, for comic scenes such as the extrication of the bus from a water-hole by a child leading a pair of oxen—and the tragic converse of the pathetic funeral of this very child on the bus' return trip. We laugh, yet Bunuel reminds us always of inescapable sadness, of frailty before temptation, and of the constant proximity of death. More than this, Bunuel successfully contrasts a particular cultural style with an underlying universality: recreating what is authentically Mexican, yet wholly comprehensible.

English film makers have been consistently successful in cinematic spoofs of the peculiar customs and personalities of unique localities in the British Isles. But while the satiric form enabled audiences to learn a great deal, as from *Passport to Pimlico,* or *Tight Little Island,* while being vastly entertained, it also kept them at a distance. There is a certain remoteness and condescension in satire, no matter how knowing; the best satire, in fact, patronizes one's own weaknesses. A new English film about Nova Scotia in 1904, *The Little Kidnappers,* involves us as the other genre comedies did not. Directed by Philip Leacock, and produced by Sergei Nolbandov and Leslie Parkyn from Neil Paterson's screenplay, the film recreates the details and personalities of another time and place with accuracy, engrossing us in an old-fashioned little story in a way to remind us of a time when the movies were as "real' as was our play, and the everyday world interpenetrated our imagination.

The Little Kidnappers are two small boys, played delightfully by Jon Whitely and Vincent Winter, who appropriate a lost baby as a pet, because they have been refused a dog by their rigidly Calvinistic grandfather. The "kidnapping" finally resolves the tensions between Dutch and Scottish homesteaders, as it brings the grandfather to realize the inhumanity of his untempered principles. Duncan Macrae is excellent as the old man, as is Adrienne Corri as his daughter and Theodore Bikel as a kindly Dutch doctor. Director Leacock's actors never break the spell by seeming to be in a movie made in 1954. Maybe this effect of skill and style is what differentiates most of all the ordinary escape films from those few which carry us off into worlds of wonder. For here we do not escape reality into a pleasant falsity, proficiently contrived, but are carried into a world made genuine, and fascinating, by art.

MARTIN S. DWORKIN

Notes on the Critics

MALCOLM COWLEY's essay will appear in his forthcoming book *The Literary Situation,* to be published in the fall by the Viking Press. ROBERT LEKACHMAN is on the Economics faculty of Barnard College. MARTIN S. DWORKIN has served with the Motion Picture Service of the United States Department of State.

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A COMMUNICATION

The Tempest over Wallace

THE TEMPEST over what Henry A. Wallace was supposed to have said about the present farm price support law (*NR*, May 3, 1954) reached me even before I had a chance to read what he actually said.

As *New Republic* fans may or may not know, the tempest started with a cover-blurb ballyhooing Mr. Wallace's article, "Why Flexible Price Supports Will Best Serve American Farmers." That cover-blurb, I told myself, doesn't sound like the Henry Wallace I knew 20 years ago.

City folk may not understand why all the fuss was stirred up in farm circles. They may see no reason why farmers were disturbed because Wallace, under whom farm prices were first made in Washington, was accused of abandoning the faith of his New Deal fathers and joining the price-flexing cult, an orthodox but obsolete economic faith which insists that flexible price supports are the farmer's best friend. Then, you city folk had better imagine what consternation the late Senator Wagner would have caused if he had denounced his Wagner Labor Act, or the late Senator Taft his Taft-Hartley Act, or the late F.D.R. the New Deal.

After reading the article, I felt that the arguments were more over the *New Republic's* headlines than the words of Henry Wallace. Too many of his followers, who should have known better, either misread or were misled by what Mr. Wallace actually said. His detractors and critics, of course, didn't need to be. They had only to wave the *New Republic's* cover-blurb to show that Wallace was now a full-fledged price-flexer. The foes of that kind of farm legislation find no word more despicable.

As for me, I found that the Henry Wallace of 1954 was no different than the Henry Wallace I knew so well in 1934, even to the dual personality of Secretary of Agriculture and Iowa corn farmer.

Let's get to the article. The first paragraph compresses the problem with which Henry is wrestling. We must recognize two personalities are speaking, otherwise we'll never understand the schizophrenic—dual—nature of the article. You see, Henry tries first to speak in the person of a former Secretary of Agriculture and Vice-President of the United States, a plain scientist, agricultural philosopher and world humanitarian, and then to make a quick change and present himself as an Iowa-bred corn farmer, looking at the day-by-day problems of farming, worrying about today's markets and tomorrow's production.

I kept running smack-dab into both these characters. Every time I was about ready to harmonize with a Secretary of Agriculture, I found myself tangling with an Iowa corn farmer.

Speaking as a Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Wallace warns, "The all-important thing is that the farmer and his friends should not destroy the really splendid features of the farm program as it was evolved during the thirties." Most farmers agree.

But then, as the corn farmer, Mr. Wallace declares with much alarm, "I believe that in the long run, and above all in the case of corn, the Ever-Normal Granary program can be sustained only by a flexible-support system."

That sentence unlocks the whole article. And, the key word in that key sentence is "corn."

Corn has been a favored grain for a long time. The Ever-Normal Granary helped make it so. Now, corn-farmer Wallace fears for both his Granary and his favorite crop. He wants to save both. As a corn farmer, he proposes to do it alone, without much regard for the other grains.

As Secretary of Agriculture, Mr. Wallace would be the first to say that can't be done. There is no solution to the problems of farm prices and production and distribution if the crops are handled one by one. The farm problem is inclusive. Grain is grain. Wheat is competitive with corn, corn with soybeans, soybeans with cotton seed, and oil crops with milk. No iron curtain can isolate the "contagion of abundance."

That means all grain is competitive price-wise. So what corn-farmer Wallace says about corn prices disturbs me, because it may affect the price of wheat and other grains. Mr. Wallace infers that the existing price support of 90 percent of parity is too high for corn, because it causes such vast accumulations in the hands of the Government as to jeopardize the Ever-Normal Granary. Mr. Wallace states that the way to save the Granary is to reduce the present surplus by cutting the support price on corn from 90 to 80 percent of parity. In this connection, Mr. Wallace adds that while "parity" was a good idea in the depression thirties, when farm prices were a long way from parity, now that we are close to tasting parity, he would abandon the concept, at least for corn.

Mr. Wallace feels that for the long pull, a reasonable price for corn should be closer to a ratio of $1.30 a bushel, with $17 a hundred for hogs. On the basis of cost sheets I have for wheat and other grains, I doubt very much if a lower support price would be desirable for the agricultural economy. The concept of parity is too sound to have it abandoned overnight. Rather than compromise it by saying 80 percent of parity is a fair price for corn, and thus weakening the entire parity concept and structure, it would be much sounder to revise the parity formula for crops that seem out of line so as to accurately reflect current agricultural requirements.

If Mr. Wallace is right on corn prices, then parity is too high a goal for farmers to strive for. If the farmer gets too much for his products, then the way to get rid of his surplus is to unload this distressed surplus stock at bargain-counter prices. But will "bargain-counter prices" for corn really reduce the surplus to any extent, and equally important, can the farmer afford another clip off his "take-home pay"?

In the matter of cutting prices to reduce surpluses, I would like to quote Louis H. Bean, a top economist in the Department of Agriculture for two decades. He informed the Congressional Joint Committee on the Economic Report that "flexible prices and a lower,

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modernized parity level do not without additional measures guarantee the hoped-for reduction in acreage or production, nor greater consumption and exports." Proof of that was furnished by Secretary of Agriculture Benson when he reduced butter support prices from 90 to 75 percent of parity last April. Butter has been piling up ever since.

How does the farmer fare economically? Is he getting too big a share of the national income? Is he rolling in clover? Here is the record:

1. Farmers are just under 15 percent of the population, but get less than 6 percent of the national income.

2. The total national income rose from 1952 to 1953. Just the opposite was true for farmers. Income of farm owners dropped $2.4 billion between 1952 and 1953. A further drop has been experienced in 1954.

3. In 1949, only 103,231 farms had gross sales of farm products of over $25,000; only 381,151 had gross sales of between $10,000 and $24,999; 721,-21 had gross sales of $5,000 to $9,999; 882,302 had gross sales of only $2,500 to $4,999; 901,316 had gross sales of only between $1,200 and $2,499, while 717,201 had gross sales of only between $250 and $1,199. That is a breakdown of 3,706,412 commercial farms listed in 1949. The balance of 1,672,838 farms are listed as part-time, residential or abnormal.

In a recent correspondence I had with Henry Wallace, he made clear his concern is about corn. He was not discussing other commodities. He is aware that "the demand for wheat cannot be increased by cutting the price." But two things disturb him. He states: "Corn is in a far different category from wheat and cotton; I am concerned about wheat and cotton acres being put into feed grains (also diverted corn acres as well)." The other thing that disturbs him is: "How many acres can we grow without being forced to put large quantities of wheat on the foreign market at a price which will demoralize farmers of Canada and Australia."

Both these matters disturb me, too. At the moment, imported acres—millions of bushels of imported grain continue to add to our surpluses. What do we do about this heavy flow of imported grains? It has demoralized some grain prices already. But, I agree with Henry Wallace that a two-price or dumping program is no solution for surpluses. We most certainly do not want to demoralize the farmers of Canada and Australia any more than we want to demoralize the farmers here at home.

The big question then is what do we do when there is too much of everything that farmers produce? Dumping won't do the job, either abroad or at home. Then, if we oppose price cutting for grain abroad, why should we approve of it for our domestic market?

What disturbs me most about the Henry Wallace article is that he writes as a corn farmer, not as the great Secretary of Agriculture he was. He is static, rather than dynamic. Where is the imagination that produced his appeal for "60 million jobs."

We cannot forget the farmer while we deal in abstract symbols and lifeless generalities. He must have money. He must have enough take-home pay. We can meet this problem by doing what labor did—by shortening hours and getting more pay per hour, or unit of less production.

The working man used to work 60 hours a week. Now it's down to 40 hours a week. But when the working man's work week was cut 30 percent, he didn't take a cut in wages. He didn't get 70 percent of parity. He worked fewer hours but got the same amount of pay, maybe more. He fought for a living wage, and he figured out what he needed on the basis of his take-home pay.

Now, they're telling farmers they work too long—produce too much. The dairy farmer's price was cut 15 percent—so what happened? Dairy farmers are trying to produce more—working longer hours—to keep up the old pay income level. Wheat farmers decided to hold the line by cutting acreage in wheat 20 percent. That means the wheat farmer's paycheck is cut by that amount unless he plants something else on those diverted acres. And that piles up surpluses of other commodities.

If we are really going to cut our farm production, but keep our farm economy in good enough shape to meet the demands a growing population will make of it in a few years—or a cold war may exact in the next few months—let's be realistic. Let's permit farmers to earn enough money to live decently on a parity with the rest of the nation. Let's have our parity formula include a provision whereby the farmer is compensated when he takes out of production and puts into a soil bank those acres that are now causing all the surpluses which plague the Administration.

In the case of wheat, we might have to take out as much as 30 percent of the acreage. If that were so, I'd peg the support price of wheat at $3.00 a bushel. That reduced production would end the surplus in three years, if we used marketing quotas in terms of bushels and not acres. It would end the cost to the Government within that time. And the price would keep farmers in business.

What would the net effect be? An increase of less than 2 cents on a loaf of bread. In the past five years, bread has gone up over 4 cents a loaf to take care of transportation, labor, distribution, and so forth, without any regard to wheat prices. I would recommend that we apply the same plain economics to the case of the wheat farmer that is applied to transportation, millers, labor, bakers' profits and so forth.

St. Paul, Minn. M. W. THATCHER

Mr. Thatcher has been General Manager of the Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association since its organization in 1938; he is also President of the National Federation of Grain Co-operatives composed of 21 regionals handling over 400 million bushels annually.

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A Corporal Writes from

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

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